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Pejorative discourse is not fictional
Abstract
Hom and May argue that pejoratives mean negative prescriptive prop-
erties that externally depend on racist ideologies, and that this entails a
form of fictionalism: pejoratives have null extensions. This paper argues
that pejorative discourse is not fictional. There are relevant uses of fic-
tional terms that are necessary to describe the content of fictions, and to
make true statements about the world, that do not convey that speakers
are committed to the fiction. The paper shows that the same construc-
tions with pejoratives typically convey that the speaker is committed to
racist ideologies, in contrast with fictional discourse that typically does
not. The disanalogy undermines the plausibility of fictionalism about
pejoratives. Moreover, the exceptions – uncommitted uses in embedded
constructions – display features that conflict with Hom and May’s expla-
nation of committed uses as conversational implicatures.
1 Introduction
Pejoratives offend and insult. Prima facie, they slur the people they refer to. Ac-
cording to Hom (2008, 2012) and Hom and May (2013, 2015) pejoratives express
complex socially constructed negative properties that are determined in virtue
of standing in causal external relations to racist ideologies and social practices.
The negative properties expressed are prescriptive – they recommend certain
attitudes and behavior. But no one should be subjected to those attitudes or
behavior, and thus pejoratives have empty extensions. Hom and May argue that
this means that pejoratives are neither co-intensional nor co-extensional with
their neutral counterparts. Sentences like ‘Jews are kikes’ are false, because
‘kike’ has a null extension. Although people who use a slur may presume that
they refer to certain people, they are mistaken – there are no such people. In
the relevant respects, Hom and May claim, ‘kike’ is like ‘unicorn’, a situation
that would justify fictionalism about pejoratives.
The aim of this paper is to show that there is an important disanalogy
between fictional discourse and pejorative discourse. This disanalogy under-
mines fictionalism about pejoratives. Moreover, the exceptions – uncommitted
uses in embedded constructions – conflict with Hom and May’s explanation of
committed uses as conversational implicatures. §2 presents the central claims
under discussion, §3 argues for the disanalogy between fictional and pejorative
discourse. §4 suggests that Hom and May’s non-derogatory uncommitted uses
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display features that conflict with their explanation relying on conversational
implicatures.
2 The Semantic Strategy for Pejoratives, Ideol-
ogy and Social Practices
Hom (2008, 2012) offered a semantic account of the content of racial epithets
– Combinatorial Externalism (CE). The derogatory content of an epithet like
‘kike’, for instance, is part of its literal semantic meaning, and is expressed in
every context of utterance. This reveals that ‘kike’ and ‘Jew’ don’t have the
same meaning.
‘Kike’ = a pejorative for Jews.
‘Jew’ = the non-pejorative term for a group of people (determined by their
ascendency/religion).
CE is externalist about the meaning of pejoratives. The external factors that
determine the meaning of p joratives are racist ideologies, along with the dis-
criminatory practices that the ideologies support, not speakers’ intentions or
beliefs.
Hom and May (2013, 2015) uphold the central aspects of CE, namely that
the normative meaning of a pejorative depends on social ideologies, that the
meaning of pejoratives and their neutral counterparts are different, and that
pejoratives and their counterparts are not co-extensional because pejoratives
have null extensions. They conclude that these claims support the moral and
semantic innocence view of pejoratives. According to moral and semantic inno-
cence,
There are no kikes because there is no one who ought to be the
object of negative moral evaluation just because they are Jewish.
(Hom and May, 2013, 295)
In other words, (1) is false whereas (2) is true.
(1) Jews are kikes.
(2) Jews are not kikes.
Hom and May (2015) want to give a unified semantic account of all sentences
containing pejoratives. Now, the uses of pejoratives in embedded and unembed-
ded contexts typically induce squeamishness (Hom, 2008, 435), and are usually
perceived as offensive. Hom and May distinguish between derogatory committed
uses and non-derogatory uncommitted uses of pejoratives.
Hom and May (2015) claim that the offensiveness of slurs is over-generated,
and is merely a ‘psychological phenomenon’ (Hom and May, 2013, 310). This
psychological effect, they argue, is a conversational implicature in which the
speaker is committed to the non-empty extensionality of the predicate, and in
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which the speaker accepts that the targets of the pejorative are worthy of con-
tempt. The speaker thereby implicates that she is committed to the underlying
racist ideology (Hom and May, 2013, 310).1 The use of the word conversation-
ally implicates that the speaker is talking from an internal point of view.2 The
conversational implicature is generated unless the speaker explicitly cancels it,
or unless it is common ground that the implicature is false.
Recently, Hom and May (2015) argued that pejoratives are like fictional
terms, since fictional terms also have null extensions (Hom and May, 2015, 1).
‘Kike’, they claim, is like ‘unicorn’ or ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Atomic declarative
sentences containing fictional names are false, although meaningful. Just as
fictional propositions are essentially inapt for material truth, so are pejorative
propositions.3 Let us call this view fictionalism about pejorative discourse.
Fictionalism about scientific theories that postulate unobservable theoretical
entities is the anti-realist view that scientists talk as if scientific laws are true,
and as if theoretical entities exist; but theoretical terms for unobserved theo-
retical entities do not actually refer, and scientific laws are not actually true.
Fictionalism about pejorative discourse is the anti-realist view that racists talk
as if racial epithets refer, although they are mistaken in doing so, because racist
epithets have null extensions. As Szabó (2001) says,
To be a fictionalist about F s is to think that our naïve attitude to-
ward F -discourse is only halfway correct: we are right in thinking
that we use genuine singular terms that purport to refer to F s, but
wrong in thinking that they actually succeed in referring. In engag-
ing in F -discourse we inadvertently slip into fictional talk. (Szabó,
2001, 294)
The next section shows that there is a crucial disanalogy between fictional
and pejorative discourse, which undermines fictionalism about pejoratives.
3 Fictionalism and Types of Fictional Discourse
Fictional terms contribute in different ways to the meaning and truth-value of
the sentences where they occur. Not all such possible uses are part of works of
fiction. Some are true descriptions of the content of fictions, and some are true
statements about the world. Significantly, these true statements do not signal
1The inference of the conversational implicature would seem to require that the meaning of
the pejorative is available to the speakers, but this is in possible conflict with the externalist
claim that the meaning of the pejorative meanings does not depend on the speakers’ intentions
or beliefs.
2The distinction between internal and external normative statements is common for in-
stance in legal theory where, after Hart (2012), theorists distinguish between internal legal
statements, made from the point of view of officials in a jurisdiction, and external legal state-
ments that are descriptive of what the law is at a jurisdiction.
3Normally, ‘inapt for material truth’ means not truth-valued, i.e., inapt for either truth or
falsehood. This conflicts with the naïve semantic innocent view according to which (1) above
is false, and its negation (2) is true.
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that the speaker (or the reader) is engaged with the fiction, but merely that the
speaker is describing aspects of reality.
Bonomi (2008) distinguishes the three possible uses of fictional terms.
Textual Sentences which are part of the text itself. E.g.: Sherlock Holmes seemed
delighted at the idea of sharing his rooms with me. (Conan Doyle, A Study
in Scarlet)
Paratextual Sentences by means of which we can state something true (or false) on the
basis of the story narrated. E.g.: According to Conan Doyle’s A Study in
Scarlet, Sherlock Holmes seemed delighted at the idea of sharing his rooms
with Dr. Watson.
Metatextual Sentences used to make true statements in the context of the real world.
E.g.: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar loves Sherlock Holmes.
When Conan Doyle writes ‘Holmes lives in Baker Street’, he is uttering a
sentence which, taken literally, is supposed to refer to a person called ‘Holmes’,
and to ascribe a certain location in space to his lodgings. No reinterpretation
is required to understand the sentence that Conan Doyle is uttering, and none
would be adequate in order to understand it. He is putting forward an untrue
claim, because of the lack of reference of the singular term ‘Holmes’. However,
Conan Doyle is not purporting to assert an untrue claim of this kind, still less
presuming to be in a position to know it. He is doing something else, he is
engaging with fiction-making.
According to van Fraassen (1980), the proponents of scientific theories are
doing something similar. Van Fraassen holds that scientific claims about observ-
able entities must be true, but that scientific claims about what is unobservable
can be both adequate and untrue. He characterizes realism about scientific the-
ories as the position that holds the following three claims (van Fraassen, 1980,
12):
(i) Scientific theories should be interpreted at face value. ‘There are quarks’
makes the same kind of claim as ‘there are cans of beer in the fridge’:
there is no reinterpretation.
(ii) Scientific theories purport to be true.
(iii) We may in principle have good reasons for believing that a scientific theory
is true.
Anti-realists may require a reinterpretation of the central terms of the theory,
but still hold (ii) and (iii) as correct. Alternatively, a fictionalist anti-realist can
maintain (i), but reject (ii) and (iii). The sentences in the theory are interpreted
at face value, but are not true.
Interestingly, the three types of use of fictional terms that Bonomi (2008)
identifies can be discriminated within a fictionalist view of scientific discourse. If
we are fictionalists about unobservable theoretical entities, there will be textual,
paratextual, and metatextual uses of terms like ‘quarks’. Compare:
4
Page 4 of 12Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
For Review Only
Textual Sentences which are part of science. E.g.: Quarks combine to form hadrons.
Paratextual Sentences by means of which we can state something true (or false) on
the basis of the theory. E.g.: According to the Standard Model of particle
physics, quarks combine to form hadrons. A speaker can be committed to
its truth, but uttering the sentence does not signal that she is committed
to the background theory sustaining the meaning of the scientific terms.
Metatextual Sentences used to make true statements in the context of the real world.
E.g.: Quarks were independently proposed by physicists Murray Gell-Mann
and George Zweig in 1964. A speaker can be committed to its truth, but
uttering the sentence does not signal that the speaker is committed to the
background theory sustaining the meaning of the scientific terms.
There is a difference in fictional textual discourse between hermeneutical and
revolutionary fictionalism (Burgess (1983), Stanley (2001).) Hermeneutic fic-
tionalism about an area of discourse is a thesis that states that speakers do
not actually aim at literal truth, but only pretend to do so. This is an apt
description of what Conan Doyle did in writing the Sherlock Holmes novels.
Revolutionary fictionalism about an area of discourse states that speakers who
engage with that area of discourse ought only to make pretend-assertions. This
is what anti-realist fictionalists about unobservable postulates of science claim
scientists should be doing.
Whether or not one is a fictionalist about scientific entities, textual uses
of scientific terms conversationally implicate that a speaker is committed to
terms having a non-null extension, and therefore that they accept the under-
lying theory. Yet, paratextual and metatextual uses do not implicate any such
commitment of the speaker.4
According to Hom and May’s fictionalism about pejorative discourse, a tex-
tual use of a pejorative implicates that the speaker is committed to the racist
ideology:
Offensiveness can be linguistically triggered, because when speakers
use predicates, they typically conversationally implicate their com-
mitment to the non-null extensionality of the predicate. (Hom and
May, 2013, 310)
The best model for Hom and May is revolutionary fictionalism, which, in
the case of scientific terms, predicts that in many textual uses there is an impli-
cation that the speaker, not herself a fictionalist, takes the terms not be empty.
Granting this, the same clearly doesn’t apply to corresponding paratextual and
metatextual sentences. But there is a disanalogy between scientific terms and
pejoratives. The implicature (if that is what it is) is also typically present in
paratextual and metatextual discourse. Contrast:
4Utterances of those sentences are of course compatible with the speaker turning out to be
committed to the truth of a theory, but this commitment is not required.
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Textual Prima facie, textual pejorative sentences are sentences like, e.g.: Kikes are
untrustworthy. According to fictionalism, sentences like this are not apt
for material truth.
Paratextual Paratextual pejorative sentences should be sentences by means of which
we truly state the content of anti-Semitic ideology. E.g.: According to
the alt-right media, kikes are untrustworthy. Paratextual uses of fictional
terms can be true, and a speaker can be committed to its truth, but
uttering the sentence should not signal that the speaker is committed to
the background ideology sustaining the slur.
Metatextual Metatextual sentences should be sentences by means of which we make
true statements in the context of the real world. E.g.: Jones loves kikes. A
speaker can be committed to its truth, but uttering the sentence should not
signal that the speaker is committed to the background ideology sustaining
the slur.
If fictionalism about pejorative discourse were correct, the three sentences above
should reveal not only differences in truth-values, but also differences in deroga-
tory commitment.
Similar implicatures exist in textual uses of fictional words and uses of pejo-
ratives. Non-enlightened users of scientific textual discourse assume that their
theoretical terms refer. For instance, a physicist’s use of the sentence quarks
combine to form hadrons in a lecture conversationally implicates that the lec-
turer is committed to the non-empty extension of the terms used, and hence
accepts the theory she is teaching.
In paratextual and metatextual uses of fictional words there is no implicature
(or presupposition) that the speaker is committed to the scientific theory or
engaged with the fiction. However, paratextual and metatextual pejorative
constructions derogate and are offensive. They all convey a committed point of
view (whether or not the speaker is actually committed).
In the paratextual case, we should expect the speaker to be committed only
to the truth of the sentence According to the alt-right media, kikes are untrust-
worthy. But by uttering this sentence the speaker also communicates that she
accepts anti-Semitic ideology. Yet, a report like According to the Standard Model
of particle physics, quarks combine to form hadrons does not communicate that
the speaker is committed to the truth of the claims of the Standard Model of
particle physics, or to the existence of unobservable theoretical entities.
Metatextual uses like quarks were independently proposed by physicists Mur-
ray Gell-Mann and George Zweig in 1964 do not implicate that the speaker
accepts that there are quarks. By contrast, Jones loves kikes derogates Jewish
people, and indicates that the speaker has racist attitudes (whether or not the
speaker actually has any).
There is hence an important and unexplained disanalogy between genuine
fictional discourse and pejorative discourse. The only explanation that Hom &
May offer that could apply here – that there is a presumption that the speaker
subscribes the underlying racism – is precisely what draws attention to the
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difference between fictional and pejorative discourse. Whereas only textual fic-
tional uses implicate that the speaker is engaged with the fictional narrative,
typically the three constructions with pejoratives sound offensive, even to us,
the theorists reading the examples.
We have to replace the pejorative with a neutral counterpart to describe the
content of the ideology or of aspects of the world (like the beliefs of racists) in
non-derogatory non-committed ways:
(3) According to the alt-right media, Jewish people are untrustworthy.
(4) Jones believes that Jewish people are less trustworthy than Chinese
people.
Hom and May could claim that the normative meaning of pejoratives is what
explains why their use typically conversationally implicates committed readings
whereas non-presc iptive fictional discourse doesn’t.
When people make a normative statement like (5), or use a thick value term5
as in (6) or (7), they normally implicate that they accept the supporting social
norm:
(5) You shouldn’t interrupt when someone else is speaking.
(6) It is rude to interrupt when someone else is speaking.
(7) It was rude of me to interrupt you just now.
Yet, normative statements can also be made externally, i.e., as uncommitted
descriptions of existing norms. (8), (9), and (10) don’t implicate that the speaker
is committed to German social norms.
(8) According to German social norms, you shouldn’t interrupt when some-
one else is speaking.
(9) According to German social norms, it is rude to interrupt when someone
else is speaking.
(10) According to German social norms, I was rude for interrupting you
just now.
These examples do not conversationally implicate that the speaker is committed
to German social norms. They could have had that implicature if the speaker
were German or speaking in Germany.
The disanalogy between fictional and pejorative sentences points to an un-
derlying problem with the motivation for fictionalism about pejorative discourse.
Fictionalism about a given domain, for instance scientific theories, is indepen-
dently motivated by anti-realism about certain entity types, for instance unob-
served theoretical entities.
5The distinction between thick value words and thin value words originates in the work
of Bernard Williams (1985). Thick value words, like ‘rude’ or ‘brave’ combine an evaluative
and a non-evaluative descriptive content, whereas thin value words like ‘good’ would be only
evaluative.
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Hom and May (2015) claim that the content of pejoratives is expressible
as a prescriptive predicate: ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation
because of being a G (Hom and May, 2015, 7). But prescriptions for socially
determined groups do not single out an entity type which we, prima facie, have
independent reasons to be skeptical about, unless we are deontic nihilists. Hom
and May are not moral or deontic nihilists.
Suppose someone expresses her strong moral disapproval of Flynn’s behavior
by derogating him with the sentence in (9):
(11) Flynn is a fucking traitor.
The speaker believes that whoever commits treason against their own countries
ought to face criminal charges, and are also rightly targeted for negative moral
evaluation. Being a traitor instantiates the prescriptive property form ought to
be the target of negative moral evaluation because of being a G.
The group G in that case is not ethnical, religious, or racial. But a religious
group could deserve negative moral evaluation. Members of Aum Shinrikyo,
the apocalyptic sect responsible for the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in
1995, for instance, deserve moral condemnation. It may be disputed whether it
is only their actions, and not their status as members of the sect, that deserves
condemnation, but I’m not sure that’s correct. Simple affiliation with certain
groups might very well suffice to be contemptible, whatever group thinks merits
disapproval: the nazis, the red brigades, ETA, the IRA, Aum Shinrikyo. It
is not impossible that members of a social group G are worthy of contempt
because of being Gs.
Jeshion (2013) raises an objection based on similar cases, ‘pimp’ and ‘fuck-
ing Nazi’. As she points out, whether or not an expression is semantically a
pejorative can’t depend on whether the target group is deserving of moral dis-
approval. Rather, it must depend on semantic features of the expression itself
(Jeshion, 2013, 326-327).
It follows that negative prescriptive properties that target social groups have
possible extensions, and in some cases actual extensions, for instance ‘traitor’,
‘pimp’, ‘Nazi’, or ‘member of Aum Shinrikyo’. Hence, fictionalism about pre-
scriptive properties of the form ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation
because of being a G is unmotivated.
Hom and May antecipate this objection. They say,
Note that we do not mean to preclude that it might be good rea-
son for negative moral evaluation. . . that an individual is a member
of a certain group, as opposed to just having certain objectionable
personal properties or attitudes. In a certain sense, mass murderers
form a group, and being a mass murderer justifies negative moral
evaluation in virtue of the action one must take in order to become
a member of that group. Being a member of that group, however,
does not justify being the target of pejoration. (Hom and May, 2015,
8)
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The point here is whether being a member of a group G may suffice for blame-
worthiness. I think there are many actual instances where we do disapprove of
people just because of their group membership, without needing further infor-
mation about their actions, beliefs, or intentions. I think we are often, even if
not always, justified in blaming people just for group membership – “how could
you possibly sign up for that? What were you thinking?” Moreover, even if
we are not actually justified in the cases where we have blamed someone based
on their group membership, it is still possible that there are groups such that
membership in G is in itself blameworthy.
4 Uncommitted uses: cancelled implicatures, can-
celled presuppositions, or quotational contexts?
Although Hom and May acknowledge that pejoratives normally “scope out”,
as in the paratextual and metatextual constructions in the previous section,
they also give examples of non-derogatory non-appropriated uses. They account
for committed derogatory uses as conversationally implicating that the speaker
commits to the non-empty extension of the pejorative, and as a result implicat-
ing that the speaker commits to the ideology. Conversational implicatures can
be explicitly cancelled, or can fail to be inferred if it is clear that the common
ground defeats them.
Below I adapt some of Hom’s examples
(12) Antisemitic institutions that treat Jewish people as kikes are morally
depraved.
(13) John thinks that I’m a kike [uttered by a Jewish person].6
The example in (12) presumably cancels out the implicature by denouncing the
treatment in question as morally depraved. And the example in (13) presumably
defeats the implicature, assuming that the parenthetical remark that the speaker
is Jewish defeats the implicature that the speaker accepts anti-Semitic ideology.
The existence of these non derogatory non-appropriated uses does not un-
dermine my argument that there is a disanalogy between pejorative discourse
and fictional discourse. If we contrast (12) and (13) with (8), (9), and (10) the
disanalogy in normative commitments becomes clearer.
Following Hom and May’s conversational implicature explanation, (12) and
(13) are not committed readings because information that contradicts the im-
plicature cancels the committed derogatory reading. That information is either
that antisemitism is morally depraved, or that the speaker is herself Jewish. But
in (8), (9), and (10) we have the inverse situation. The sentences do not display
any committed internal reading to begin with, and we would need additional
information from context to conversationally infer any committed reading. For
instance,
6These cases modify examples (27) and (28) in Hom (2012), p. 388.
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(14) According to German social norms, it is rude to interrupt when some-
one else is speaking. [uttered in Germany]
(15) My mother says that I was rude for interrupting you. [uttered by a
young German speaker]
Although Hom and May claim that there are other non-derogatory uses, it’s un-
clear what explains non-derogatory cases in general. In general, adding ‘uttered
by a Jewish person’ does not always have the neutralizing/cancelling effect it is
meant to have in (13), as (16) shows
(16) Kikes will receive bomb threats. [uttered by a Jewish person]7
The evidence provided by these cases raises doubts about the appeal to con-
versational implicatures. In (12) and (13), the pejorative is embedded under
an operator — to treat X as Y, or S thinks that.... Presuppositional inferences
are typically cancellable by direct denial only when the presupposition trigger
is embedded under another operator (Gazdar (1979)). Although there is no
explicit denial in (12) or (13), the denial of the presupposition is inferable either
from the information explicitly provided, or from context. This would suggest
a presuppositional account, not a conversational implicature account, of the
derogatory character of pejoratives.
In contrast, the non-derogatory uses (12) and (13) are the result of the
implicitly quotational contexts where they occur. Bianchi (2014) argues for
an echoic explanation of non-derogatory appropriated uses. If non-derogatory
non-appropriated uses occur in quotational contexts, then pejoratives in those
contexts are mentioned and not used. Cepollaro (2015) says that slurs that are
not used but mentioned are not relevant non-derogatory uses, for the very reason
that they are mentioned (Cepollaro, 2015, 41, n. 20), as academic articles like
the present paper illustrate.
5 In summary
Metatextual and paratextual uses of names for unobserved theoretical entities
do not conversationally implicate that the speaker accepts that those scientific
terms have non-empty extensions, nor that the speaker accepts the underlying
scientific theory as true. However, similar sentences with pejoratives typically
convey that the speaker is committed to the ideology supporting the pejorative.
The difference between the fictional and the pejorative cases can’t be ex-
plained by the prescriptive or normative nature of pejoratives. Normative claims
of the form you shouldn’t do φ or it is rude to φ are normally interpreted as in-
ternal committed claims. Yet, according to such and such norms, you shouldn’t
do φ or according to such and such norms, it is rude to φ are not normally
interpreted as committed claims.
7This is based on a recent case. A US-Israeli teenager, presumably Jewish, is suspected
of being responsible for the most of the bomb threats made to Jewish Community Centers in
the US in the beginning of 2017.
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Normative or evaluative claims with embedded clauses have an internal com-
mitted reading only if additional information in the common ground entails that
the speaker is committed to the relevant underlying normative practice. The
same holds of normative claims of the form you ought to φ, or positive evalua-
tions like you are very generous to φ.
There are uncommitted non-derogatory uses of pejoratives in constructions
with the same form as paratextual and metatextual fictional sentences. But
unlike normative or evaluative cases, uncommitted uses of pejoratives require
that additional defeating information is available in context. The default inter-
pretation under embeddings is still the committed offensive reading.
Moreover, the explicit addition of presumably defeating information, or its
availability in context, does not generally suffice to cancel committed offensive
readings, as (16) above shows. This suggests that the offensiveness of a pejo-
rative results from a presupposition triggered by the use of the pejorative, not
from a conversational implicature. Uncommitted non-derogatory cases may be
explained either as the result of presuppositional cancellation, or as occurrences
in quotational contexts.8
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